报告：Audit Market Competition and Mandatory Audit Tendering
摘要：In an attempt to increase audit market competition, U.K. regulators introduced a requirement in 2012 for FTSE-350 companies to tender their audits at least once every ten years. This paper provides the first empirical evidence on the consequences of introducing mandatory tendering for companies that became subject (did not become subject) to the new tendering rule. As expected, we find an increase in audit tendering and auditor switching after companies became subject to the mandatory tendering rule. Audit fees decrease in the years when audit tendering occurs, and audit fees increase subsequent to the mandatory tendering rule in the years when tendering does not occur. Overall, we find that the net effect of introducing the tendering rule was an increase in audit fees. Thus, our findings suggest that the new mandatory tendering rule has had adverse effects on the competitiveness of the audit market, which is opposite to what regulators say they intended.
陆天慧，英国布里斯托大学（University of Bristol）会计学博士研究生，曾赴美国南加州大学（University of Southern California）访学。研究方向为审计、信息披露，以及基于资本市场的会计研究。