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【2018-06-19 学术论坛】

作者: | 发布日期:2018-06-15| 浏览次数:

讲座时间:2018年6月19日,周二,14:00-17:00

 

讲座地点:学院南路学术会堂603

 

详细议程:

 

1400-1530

讲座主题:How do the media influence government decisions? Evidence from initial public offering approval decisions in China

讲座人:田钢(Gary Gang Tian

摘要:This paper investigates whether IPO firms seek rent from the media in the form of positive coverage and whether the media influences government decisions on IPO approval. We use Chinese A-stock companies submitting IPO applications for government approval from 2006 to 2014 as samples, and manually collect and process a comprehensive dataset of newspapers to measure the tone of media coverage. We find that the public relations fee which IPO firms have paid improves positive media coverage related to IPO firms, and increases the likelihood of receiving IPO approval from the government. However, we further find that positive media reports before the IPO lead to operating performance reversal, lower cumulative abnormal returns, and more tunnelling activities after the IPO. Our findings document that, in an emerging market such as China with an imperfect legal system and an immature media market, IPO firms seek rent to cover up defective conditions by the media packaging, and that the media coverage influences government decisions on IPO approval.

讲座人简介:田钢(Gary Gang Tian),澳大利亚麦考瑞大学(Macquarie University)管理与经济学院金融学教授。他的研究兴趣包括政治关系、社会网络等诸多公司财务话题。田教授在Management ScienceJournal of Corporate FinanceJournal of Banking and FinanceAuditing: a Journal of Practice & TheoryEuropean Accounting ReviewReview of Quantitative Finance and AccountingPacific Basin Finance JournalCorporate Governance: An International Review等主流会计与财务期刊发表诸多论文。

 

1530-1700

讲座主题:The Importance of Director External and Internal Social Networks to Stock Price Crash Risk

讲座人:方晓华(David Fang

摘要:Prior research documents that information transmitted via director networks affects firms’ policies and real economic activities. We explore whether information flow through director networks influences managers’ ability to hoard bad news. We find that the extent of external connections of the board of directors is negatively associated with future stock price crash risk. Additional analysis implies that this evidence is driven by firms with more powerful executives, with weaker auditor monitoring, or subject to strong investor protection, and by directors with greater monitoring incentives or responsibilities, with less firm-specific knowledge, and with more valuable reputations to protect. We further find that director external network size is negatively associated with a variety of bad new hoarding signals. Collectively, we provide empirical support for the monitoring view under which better informed directors narrow the scope for bad news hoarding evident in stock price crash risk. In another series of tests, we fail to find evidence consistent with the information leakage view under which directors pass sensitive firm-specific information to connections who trade on the information before its public release. Other analysis helps dispel the concern that the endogenous match between directors and companies is spuriously responsible for our core results. In contrast to our strong, robust evidence on the role that director external networks play, we only find some results implying that CEO-director internal networks shape stock price crash risk.

讲座人简介:方晓华(David Fang),佛罗里达大西洋大学(Florida Atlantic University)助理教授。博士毕业于多伦多大学。他的研究兴趣包括资本市场的信息披露和股利分配、企业社会责任、社会规范和审计等。其研究发表在Journal of Financial and Quantitative AnalysisContemporary Accounting ResearchJournal of Accounting and Public PolicyAccounting HorizonsJournal of Banking and Finance等主流会计与财务期刊。