讲座主题：Disclosure Clustering and Scheduled Macro News Announcements
摘要：We adopt a real-option perspective and examine how scheduled macro news announcements shape the timing of corporate disclosures. Under a real-option framework, managers have an incentive to wait until the realization of macro news to make disclosure decisions. Once scheduled macro news is announced, managers who find it beneficial will disclose private information, leading to a clustering of corporate disclosures. Employing the setting of Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) pre-scheduled meetings, we document that management guidance clusters during the [1, 3] day window following FOMC meetings. This clustering effect is more pronounced when the cost of waiting is low and when the potential benefit of waiting is high. This effect does not result from timely disclosures of managers’ updated beliefs after FOMC meetings and is not significantly affected by managers’ career concern. We conclude that the option value of waiting causes corporate disclosures to cluster after scheduled macro news announcements.