时间：2020年12月10日（周四上午），10:00-12:00
地点：腾讯APP会议（会议号：请有意向参加的博士生和老师联系赵莹老师获取）
研讨会详细议程：10:00-11:00
报告：Short-Selling Pressure and Corporate Tax Aggressiveness
报告人：彭章
摘要：We study how short-selling pressure affects tax aggressiveness using the pilot program on short sales in Regulation SHO. Using a difference-in-differences approach, we find that higher short-selling pressure significantly reduces tax aggressiveness. To explain the reduction, we offer a simple agency-theoretic model and provide evidence that when short-selling pressure increases, the likelihood of detecting questionable tax shelters increases, discouraging tax aggressiveness. Corroborating this evidence, we also find stronger (weaker) effects of short-selling pressure on firms subject to fewer (more) audits by the IRS before the pilot program. These findings suggest that short-sellers help reduce aggressive tax avoidance schemes.
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报告人简介：
彭章，清华大学经济管理学院金融系博士研究生，本科毕业于浙江大学经济学院金融系，2018年8月-2019年12月于密歇根大学安娜堡分校罗斯商学院访学。研究方向为公司金融、公司治理、劳动与金融、机器学习在公司金融的应用、金融科技。已发表论文4篇，分别发表于《管理科学学报》、《投资研究》（2篇）、《浙江社会科学》。工作论文8篇，一篇于《金融研究》二审修改中，一篇于《南开管理评论》三审修改中，一篇投至Journal of Accounting Research.
研讨会详细议程：11：00-12:00
报告：The Effects of Pre-trade Disclosure Regulation on Insider Trading: Evidence from the China A-share Market
报告人：郭凯
摘要：Since June 2017, directors, supervisors, and senior executives of the China A-share firms have been required to disclose their share sale plans before they can sell shares. In this paper, we use this unique setting to investigate how this pre-trade disclosure requirement affects insider trading. We find that the market reacts negatively to the announcements of sale plans and market reactions to sale plans are positively associated with future earnings information, suggesting that the announcements of sale plans enable the market to infer insiders’ information. We also find that insiders make fewer information-driven insider sales in the post-reform period. Finally, there is evidence that stock prices become less efficient after this regulation. Overall, the findings suggest that the pre-trade disclosure regulation reduces the volume of informed insider sales at the expense of stock price informativeness.
报告人简介：
郭凯，新加坡国立大学会计学博士研究生。研究方向为公司治理，公司披露，内部人交易和公共监管。
